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NOTES AND COMMENTS
quently the term, "injury to the family" was used in that case, and later
cases merely repeated it. Later cases seem to omit the phrase "to the
family," and in a more recent case' 7 it is stated that the recovery for
the value of a child's life is not what his services might have been worth
to someone else during his minority, but what his entire life would have
been worth to himself if he had lived. In Queen City Coach Co. v.
Lee' s8 the judge's charge was "pecuniary worth (of deceased) to his
estate," and this was held to be in accordance with North Carolina
authorities. If there is no family or next of kin to take the recovery,
the University of North Carolina is entitled to the recovery' 9 indicating
clearly that the recovery does not depend on loss to the family of the
decedent.
Evidence of the provident attitude of the deceased was admited in
one case20 when offered by the plaintiff, but it was considered that the
evidence of deceased's having been a good provider for his family
showed a constant attention to his business, and thus was admitted to
show earning capacity. In the principal case, the non-support order,
the divorce complaint, and the inventory do tend to show lack of a
provident attitude by deceased, but tend very remotely, if at all, to show
earning capacity or decedent's own living expenses. When the evi-
dence on non-support, however, is coupled with the inventory of
decedent's estate there is an indication of the decedent's personal ex-
penditures, and on this ground these two offers could be relevant, for
if a man has given his family a small amount of his wages and his estate
shows almost nothing, then a high degree of probability exists that per-
sonal expenditures were high. But as pointed out by the dissent, there
was nothing in the record to show that deceased's contributions to his
family were controlled by the support order. Accordingly this com-
bination of evidence has little probative value.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion would permit the excluded evi-
dence to come in to show lack of provident attitude, this case seems
to be out of line with the other North Carolina cases holding to a strict
net-income theory and rejecting the loss to beneficiaries theory.
BASIL SHERRILL.
Domestic Relations-Actions-Wife's Tort Liability to Husband
In Scholtens v. Scholtens,' plaintiff husband brought an action against
his wife to recover damages for personal injuries which he received in
an automobile accident allegedly caused by her negligence. Thus the
"Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N. C. 961, 36 S. E. 191 (1900)."8218 N. C. 320, 11 S. E. 2d 341 (1940).
1" Warner v. Western N. C. R. R., 94 N. C. 250 (1886).
" Hicks v. Love, 201 N. C. 773, 161 S. E. 395 (1931).
1230 N. C. 149, 52 S. E. 2d 350 (1949).
19491
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
question of whether a husband may maintain an action against his wife
for a personal tort committed during coverture was presented for the
first time in this state. The North Carolina Supreme Court held that
the husband had no right to maintain such an action.
It is well known that at common law the husband and wife became
one by marriage. 2 The legal existence of the wife was suspended dur-
ing coverture and incorporated into that of her husband, she being
unable to sue or be sued without his joinder. As one could not sue
himself, neither spouse could sue the other. The majority of states still
recognize the common law disability of husband and wife to maintain
personal tort actions inter se,3 the reasons advanced being similar in
most jurisdictions denying liability. One reason is that the various
Married Women's Acts, some of which purport to allow the wife to
sue and be sued as if she were single, are said to be in derogation of
the common law and thus to be strictly construed. Suits between hus-
band and wife are declared to be against public policy in that they tend
to break up the family unit. It is also reasoned that husband and wife
have an adequate remedy in the criminal and divorce laws.
• In 1868 the common law disability of a wife to sue was partially
removed in North Carolina by a statute allowing her to sue without her
husband's joinder under certain circumstances. 4 This was held to mean
that a wife might sue her husband when the action concerned her
separate property.5 In 1913 another statute further enlarged married
Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611 (1910) ; Peters v. Peters, 156 Cal. 32,
103 Pac. 219 (1909); Aldrich v. Tracy, 221 Iowa 84, 269 N. W. 30 (1936);
Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N. W. 624 (1920); Austin v. Austin, 136
Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); Butterfield v. Butterfield, 195 Mo. App. 37, 187
S. W. 295 (1916) ; Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923).8 Thompson v. Thompson, supra note 2; Ewald v. Lane, 104 F. 2d 222 (D. C.
Cir. 1939) ; Cubbison v. Cubbison, 73 Cal. App. 2d 437, 166 P. 2d 387 (1946) ;
Carmichael v. Cirmichael, 53 Ga. App. 663, 187 S. E. 116 (1936); Broaddus v.
Wilkenson, 281 Ky. 601, 136 S. W. 2d 1052 (1940); Harvey v. New Amsterdam
Casualty Co., 6 So. 2d 774 (La. Ct. of App. 1942); Anthony v. Anthony, 135
Me. 54, 188 A. 724 (1937); Callow v. Thomas, 322 Mass. 550, 78 N. E. 2d 637
(1948) ; Kircher v. Kircher, 288 Mich. 669, 286 N. W. 120 (1939) ; Keralis v.
Keralis, 213 Minn. 31, 4 N. W. 2d 632 (1942) ; Scales v. Scales, 168 Miss. 439,
151 So. 551 (1934); Mullally v. Langenberg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98
S. W. 2d 645 (1936); Lang v. Lang, 24 N. J. Misc. 26, 45 A. 2d 822 (1946);
Tanno v. Elby, 78 Ohio App. 21, 68 N. E. 2d 813 (1946); Fisher v. Diehl, 156
Pa. Super. Ct. 476, 40 A. 2d 912 (1945) ; Lunt v. Lunt, 121 S. W. 2d 445 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1938) ; Comstock v. Comstock, 106 Vt. 50, 169 A. 903 (1934) ; Staats
v. Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S. E. 2d 916 (1943) ; McKinney
v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P. 2d 940 (1943).
'N. C. CONSOL. STAT. §454 (1941) : "When a married woman is a party, her
husband must be joined with her, except that-1. When the action concerns her
separate property, she may sue alone. 2. When the action is between herself and
her husband, she may sue or be sued alone. In no case need she prosecute or
defend by a guardian or next friend." This statute was deleted in the codification
of the North Carolina General Statutes of 1943 as having been superseded by
Chapter 52 entitled Married Women.
'Graves v. Howard, 159 N. C. 594, 75 S. E. 998 (1912) ; Perkins v. Brinkley,
133 N. C. 154, 45 S. E. 536 (1903); Robinson v. Robinson, 123 N. C. 136, 31
S. E. 371 (1898); McCormac v. Wiggins, 84 N. C. 278 (1881); Manning v.
Manning, 79 N. C. 293 (1878); Shuler v. Millsaps, 71 N. C. 297 (1874).
[Vol. 2..
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women's rights to sue in tort.6 Under these two statutes a wife was
allowed recovery against her husband for a willful assault.7  In 1923
the North Carolina Supreme Court held for the first time in the United
States that a wife might sue her husband in tort for negligent injury.8
Now it is well settled in North Carolina that such an action will lie.9
In North Carolina the husband has been allowed to sue the wife for
negligent tort where the cause of action arose prior to their marriage,
since by statute the subsequent marriage cannot affect her antenuptial
liability.' 0 In that case the court referred to, but expressly refused to
decide, the question presented in the Scholtens case. In the Scholtens
case the court reasoned that, since there is no statutory authorization
for the husband to sue his wife for personal injury inflicted during
coverture, the husband had only his common law rights against the
wife. The decision is based to some extent upon the fact that the
statute of 1868 was deleted in the adoption of the General Statutes of
1943.11 Since this statute of 1868 specifically enabled a married woman
to sue or be sued alone when the action was between herself and her
husband, it thus implied that the husband could indeed sue the wife.
There is some doubt as to whether the result of the Scholtens case
would have been the same had this statute not been deleted.
The question presented by the principal case has been decided on
similar facts in two other jurisdictions, Wisconsin and West Virginia.
The Wisconsin statute purports to allow a married woman to bring an
action in her own name for any personal injury as if she were sole.'
2
Under this statute it was held that a wife might sue her husband for
personal injuries caused by his negligence. 13  The Supreme Court of
Wisconsin recognized that by statute the wife's rights were superior to
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §52-10 (1943): "The earnings of a married woman by
virtue of any contract for her personal service, and any damages for personal
injuries, or other tort sustained by her, can be recovered by her suing alone, and
such earnings or recovery shall be her sole and separate property as fully as if
she had remained unmarried."
"Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), rehearing denied,
181 N. C. 66, 106 S. E. 149 (1921) (husband infected his wife with a venereal
disease).
I Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923) (negligent automobile
accident). See also Roberts v. Guaranty Co., 188 N. C. 795, 125 S. E. 611 (1924)
(husband held entitled to recover on his indemnity policy the amount of his wife's
judgment against him in Roberts v. Roberts, supra; questions of public policy and
sound morals were addressed to the Legislature).
' Bogen v. Bogen, 219 N. C. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 649 (1940) ; Alberts v. Alberts,
217 N. C. 443, 8 S. E. 2d 523 (1940) ; York v. York, 212 N. C. 695, 194 S. E.
486 (1937) ; Earle v. Earle, 198 N. C. 411, 151 S. E. 884 (1930).
10 Shirley v. Ayers, 201 N. C. 51, 158 S. E. 840 (1931).
'- N. C. CoNsoL. STAT. §454 (1941). See note 4 supra.
"
2Wis. STAT. §246.07 (1947) (".... And any married woman may bring and
maintain an action in her own name for any injury to her person or character the
same as if she were sole....").
" Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N. W. 475 (1926).
1949]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
those of her husband 14 and, when the question of the principal case was
presented, held that the husband had only his common law rights against
his wife.' 5 As a result of this decision the Wisconsin Legislature passed
a statute giving the husband the right to maintain an action against his
wife "for recovery of damages for injuries sustained to his person caused
by her wrongful act, neglect or default."'1  In West Virginia, where
the statute provided that a married woman might sue or be sued as if
she were single,'- the decision was also against the husband. The Court
reasoned that the only effect of the statute was to make it possible for
a married woman to sue or be sued by third persons without her hus-
band's joinder, not to authorize the husband to sue the wife.' 8
There are certain practical considerations which may have influenced
the Court's decision in the Scholtens case. In most tort actions between
husband and wife, especially the automobile accident cases, the real de-
fendant is an insurance company. The danger of collusion between the
insured and the person injured, present in liability insurance cases, is
considerably increased by the relationship of the parties. Hence the
Court may not have wished to further extend liability. This element
of collusion, however, has not hampered the wife's cause of action against
her husband, and there is certainly no more danger of collusion when
the husband sues the wife. Also the conventional public policy argu-
ment that such actions split the family is not applicable in the insurance
cases, since neither spouse is in fact paying the bill.
It is submitted that the result of the Scholtens case is illogical and
that had the Court so desired, it had legitimate grounds for allowing the
suit. That North Carolina has been liberal in this field heretofore is
well illustrated by the fact that it was the first state to recognize the
wife's cause of action against the husband for negligent tort.19 Judging
by the majority opinion of Chief Justice Clark in Crowell v. Crowell,20
it seems that he would have no trouble reaching a different result in the
principal case. He recognized that we have by statute adopted the com-
mon law except as it has been "abrogated, repealed or become obso-
" See Singer v. Singer, 245 Wis. 191, 197, 14 N. W. 2d 43, 47 (1944).
"Fehr v. General Accident Fire & Life Insur. Corp., Ltd., 246 Wis. 228, 16
N. W. 2d 787 (1944).
" Wis. STAT. §246.075 (1947): "A husband shall have and may maintain an
action against his wife for the recovery of damages for injuries sustained to his
person caused by her wrongful act, neglect or default." New York also changed
its common law rule by a statute enabling husband and wife to sue each other for
personal tort (N. Y. Domt. REL. LAW §57) under which it was held that a, hus-
band might sue his wife for malicious prosecution of a divorce action. Weidlich
v. Weidlich, 177 Misc. 246, 30 N. Y. S. 2d 326 (1941).
" W. VA. CoDE ANN. §4749 (1943).
S Poling v. Poling, 116 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935) ; accord, Staats v.
Co-operative Transit Co., 125 W. Va. 473, 24 S. E. 2d 916 (1943).
"Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 118 S. E. 9 (1923).
-' 180 N. C. 516, 105 S. E. 206 (1920), rehearing denied, 181 N. C. 66, 106
S. E. 149 (1921).
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lete."21 In view of the wife's rights against her husband at the present
time in North Carolina, it seems that these common law principles as to
the husband's rights against his wife are clearly antiquated. Our Court
has said that the legislature in passing the Married Women's Act in-
tended to equalize the legal status of husband and wife.2 2 If applying the
common law as to the husband's rights gives the wife rights superior
to those of her husband, the common law in this respect is obsolete and
should not be the law. Further our court has long recognized that the
common law unity of husband and wife no longer exists, having been
changed by statute.23  Since the wife by statute is no longer a part of
the unit, but is separate enough even to sue her husband for personal
tort, it is a mere fiction to say they are one for purposes of the husband's
suit against his wife.
Since the court clearly indicated in the principal case that legislative
action will be necessary to change the rule enunciated, it is urged that
the Legislature of North Carolina enact a statute specifically enabling
the husband to sue his wife for personal injuries caused by 'her during
coverture.
MASON P. THOMAS, JR.
Domestic Relations-Child's Interest in the Parental Relation-
Suit by Infant for Enticement of Mother
The authorities are recent and in conflict on the question of whether
a minor child has a cause of action against an outsider for damages
suffered as a result of the outsider's enticement of the child's parent
from the family home.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has no decision on this ques-
tion. It is, however, in accord with the view that damage to relational
interests' is the true basis of similar actions of alienation of affections
2
N . C. GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1943). Italics added.
- Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N. C. 821, 825, 32 S. E. 2d 611, 614
(1944) "The effect of the legislation on the subject is to equalize the legal status
of husband and wife. . . . But if the legislative intent of equality is to prevail,
the same cause of action which is denied to the wife may not be retained or pre-
served to the husband"; Hipp v. Dupont, 182 N. C. 9, 108 S. E. 318 (1921).
"2 Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N. C. 566, 569, 118 S. E. 9, 11 (1923) "The unity
of person in the strict common-law sense no longer exists in this jurisdiction, be-
cause many of the common law disabilities have been removed. This change
relates to remedies as well as rights."
1 Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. Rzv. 461, 462 (1934). "Relational
interests are distinct interests. They extend beyond the personality, and are not
symbolized by any tangible thing which can legitimately be called property...
The situation is this: the plaintiff stands in relation to some other person; defend-
ant hurts plaintiff's relation with that person. This is a hurt done to a relational
interest."
- Chestnutt v. Sutton, 207 N. C. 256, 176 S. E. 743 (1934) ; Cottle v. Johnson.
179 N. C. 426, 102 S. E. 759 (1920) (holding that the gravamen of the cause of
action for alienation of affections of the plaintiff's wife is the deprivation of the
plaintiff of his conjugal rights to the society, affection, and assistance of his wife).
1949]
